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EQUITY RESEARCH    MASTERS IN FINANCE 
 
 Deteriorating macro outlook: We have updated our DCF 
assumptions to reflect the riskier environment for equity 
investments both in Portugal and Poland. Market Premium for 
Portugal increased from 5.4% to 6.3%, while in Poland we 
are now using 7.2% instead of the previous 6.1% 
 Sales are expected to grow at a CAGR of 7.1% in the next 10-
year period with Jerónimo Martins being much more leveraged 
to the upbeat dynamics of Biedronka . We 
highlight that the  is expected 
to grow its sales at a CAGR 9.6%1 in that same period 
 Do not forget Portugal: Even though the worst than expected 
macroeconomic environment could affect consumption in 
Portugal, we remain particularly optimistic with Retail Mainland 
operations based on: (i) Pingo Doce strong brand awareness 
Given the 
would be more resilient to declining consumer incomes 
than its peers, though not completely immune 
 De-levering process: We expect the company to gradually 
decrease its Net Debt due to its strong generation of cash 
 
 We have included a new scenario in this report concerning the 
possible Poland  Euro Adhesion in 2015. According to our 
analysis, our  
amid a stronger exchange rate and lighter valuation 
assumptions... 
                                                 
1 All Compound Average Growth Rates (CAGR) included in this report are Real growth rates, adjusted for the Euro 
currency whenever related to  
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Source: Bloomberg 
mn) 2009 2010E 2011E 
Sales 7.317 8.177 9.051 
EBITDA 528.0 597.6 663.4 
EBITDA margin (%) 7.2% 7.3% 7.3% 
Net Profit 200.3 255.8 289.1 
 0.32 0.41 0.46 
P/E (x) 21.9 20.0 17.7 
RoE (%) 18.8% 21.4% 21.6% 
EV/EBITDA (x) 10.33 9.13 8.22 
 312.0 436.7 511.6 
Source: Company Data and Nova ER Team 
 
 
  
Company description 
Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, S.A. processes, manufactures, 
and retails food and other consumer goods in Portugal 
and Poland. The company operates the Pingo Doce, 
Feira Nova, Recheio and Biedronka store chains. JMT 
also produces edible oils, spreads, and dressings, and 
manufactures detergents and household cleaners. 
Industry outlook: Defensive 
retail through hard discount operations. The sector has 
shown tremendous resilience to macroeconomic cycles. 
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INVESTMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
We are rating the stock BUY , strongly 
supported by 6 key factors, which we now summarize: 
 We expect Earnings per Share (EPS) to grow at a CAGR of 8% in the next 10-
year period, with the dividend payout gradually increasing to 70% as the 
company improves its Leverage and Liquidity position; 
 
 Both the Polish and the Portuguese retail Modern Grocery Distribution 
markets are expected to remain growing well above the inflation. The Polish 
market is expect to growth at a CAGR of 7% in the next five years, while the 
Portuguese one is expected to grow at a CAGR of 4%. In both markets we 
expect the company to keep increasing its market share, with sales growing 
well above the industry average; 
 
 We have included a new scenario concerning the possible Polish Euro 
Adhesion in 2015, which would increase our Price Target from the initial 
 the potential upside 
decreases until it reaches date; 
 
 We have also studied a possible Initial Public Offering (IPO) for Biedronka, as 
a last resource option for JMT to finance its new Internationalization process. 
According to our analysis, such scenario would yield a new PT varying 
between  
Jerónimo Martins sells 49.99%; 
 
 Brazil is also excluded from a new Internationalization process according to 
our analysis. Pão de Açúcar, Wal-Mart and Carrefour have already 
consolidated their presence, decreasing the possibility of Jerónimo Martins 
; 
 
 The main risk to our sum-of-the-parts valuation is the Zloty to face a harder 
depreciation relatively to the Euro; 
 
o Mitigating factor  We have used the Forward rates available in the market, 
which theoretically are the best proxy we can get for the future. Additionally, 
the Polish Economy is expected to outperform the remaining European 
countries in the following years. 
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Company overview 
Jerónimo Martins is the largest retailer in Portugal, closely followed by Sonae 
MC, maintaining also a high growth operation in Poland that is currently the 
unquestionable market leader. In both countries it owns hypermarkets, check 
cashing stores and supermarkets.  
Feira Nova, Pingo Doce and Recheio in 
Portugal. Regarding Poland, the company owns the 1.466-store Biedronka hard 
discount chain, which is by far the largest source of income for the group, 
representing 72% of its Net Profit in 2009. Hard-discount operations represent 
8% of the overall Polish retail market, with Biedronka currently dominating 70% of 
that segment. Additionally, the company owns an Industry unit, resulting from a 
Joint Venture with Unilever, and a Services unit, which is involved in the 
exclusive representation and distribution of international brands.  
Finally, we divided the company into the six business units mentioned above, 
analyzing and valuing each one of them separately. 
 
The majority of the capital is currently controlled by the Soares dos Santos 
family, which owns 56.1% of the company through Sociedade Francisco Manuel 
dos Santos. Even though 
free-floating, the company has other major shareholder: Asteck, S.A., with10%. 
Finally, Barclays Capital recently bought 1.72% of Jerónimo Martins outside the 
open market, increasing its position to 2.35% and becoming the most recent 
qualified shareholder.  
We recall that the company recently surprised the market when its previous CEO 
member, Mr. Pedro Soares dos Santos. However, Mr. Luís Palha will remain in 
ng investors given its critical role in Jerónimo Martins 
impressive delivery over the decade. We believe this replacement assures that 
  
Additionally, the shareholder structure differs in terms of Business Units as well. 
While Recheio, Services and Biedronka are fully owned by JMT, the same does 
not apply to Retail Mainland, Madeira and Industry operations. The first one, is 
49% owned by the Dutch retailer Ahold, an issue we will further analyze in this 
report.  
Regarding Industry, the majority of its capital is in Unilever
Services is 75% owned by Jerónimo Martins, with the remaining stake being 
detained by Lidosol and J.G. Camacho.  
Exhibit 1  Sales Breakdown  (2009) 
Source: Company Data 
Source: Company Data 
Exhibit 2  Shareholders Structure 
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Macroeconomic Analysis 
In Portugal the Government has racked up record public deficits as it pursued 
bailouts, fiscal stimulus and public spending in an attempt to revive the at least 
fragile Portuguese economy. The country now faces increasingly difficult 
challenges as it tries to boost competitiveness and persistently low GDP growth 
against the backdrop of a heavy debt burden and significant imbalances. 
Consequently, the market has perceived Portugal as a risky country with a high 
probability of incurring in default. However, we remind that Jerónimo Martins 
has its focus on the Food Retail sector, mostly through hard discount 
operations, which makes it less dependent on macroeconomic cycles.  
One might argue that Feira Nova, Industry and Services are more susceptible to 
those cycles, which 
Fortunately, the Feira Nova operations are going through a major restructuring 
process that will lead to an aggressive reduction of non-food related goods.  
The Services and Industry operations, the most exposed ones to declining 
consumer incomes, represent only 4% of our sum-of-the parts valuation. 
Therefore, any slowdown in its growth would only have a marginal impact in our 
. 
Conclusion: we maintain our previous statement that the recent economic 
turmoil has a Neutral 2. 
In Poland the Macroeconomic perspectives are much brighter, with economists 
expecting the Polish economy to keep growing well above the Euro Zone. 
Despite the fact that it had to postpone the Euro adoption due to larger public 
deficits and the sharp devaluation of the Zloty, we highlight the fact that Poland 
recorded the highest real GDP growth among OECD countries in 2009. 
Furthermore, a recent report issued by the IMF3 reinforced the growth prospects 
for the former communist country, forecasting a growth of 2.75% this year and 
3.25% in 2011. Considering its recent stoning performance
stay below 55% of its GDP this year, according to its Finance Minister Jacek 
Rostowski, therefore well below the 73.6%4 average in the European Union. 
Conclusion: despite the fact that it led to the consequent postponement of 
the Euro adoption, the measures undertaken by the Government were the 
appropriate ones as the sharp depreciation of the Zloty cushioned the 
impact of a foreign shock.
                                                 
2  The impact regarding the Cost of Debt is analyzed in the De-levering Process part of this report 
3   
4 Source: OECD 
The Polish government 
recently mentioned 2015 as 
the new target for the Euro 
adoption... 
Exhibit 3  Portuguese Macro outlook 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Source: T NS, Planet Retail 
and Nova E R Team 
Estimates 
 
Exhibit 6  Market Shares in the Portuguese M G D market 
Source: T NS, Planet Retail and Nova E R Team Estimates 
 
Retail Industry Overview 
A. PORTUGAL 
The Modern Grocery Distribution (MGD)  mn 
(2009), with food retail sales accounting for almost half of the overall retail sales. 
The rationale behind this fact lies on the fact that Portugal is still one of the 
poorest countries among the UE, with consumers spending a significant part of 
their income in food-related goods. Portuguese have consumers spent 18% of 
their overall consumption in food-related goods, which contrasts with 15% in 
Germany and only 12% in the UK5.  
Market Size and Growth 
The food retail market is a highly concentrated one, with the Top 5 retailers 
accounting for approximately 70% of the overall market. Even though this is in 
line with other European mature markets, we highlight the fact that both market 
leaders, Jerónimo Martins and Sonae MC, have market shares close to 20% 
each.  
 
 
 
 
Both retailers have been increasing their market shares, either by organic growth 
or by M&A operations. We recall that Jerónimo Martins acquired the Plus stores 
to the Tengelmann Group in 2007, reinforcing its leadership in the Portuguese 
-discount market. Furthermore, 
Sonae bought the Carrefour hypermarket operations in 2007, strengthening its 
leadership position in that segment as well.  
This consolidation process increased the weight of both companies in the 
Portuguese MGD market, a trend that has been obvious in the last three 
years (see Exhibit 4).  
Though the Portuguese macroeconomic picture remains clearly negative, with 
the country struggling to fend off the image of a new Greece, we also expect 
Jerónimo Martins to benefit from a reversion in the deflationary effect that have 
been hitting retailers since 2009 (see Exhibit 7). 
                                                 
5 Source: Government Data (2009) 
6 Including only the Minipreço operations 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 CAGR 
Jerónimo Martins 2.458 2.745 3.172 3.407 12% 
Sonae MC 2.215 2.391 2.930 3.106 12% 
Intermarché 1.243 1.393 1.484 1.581 8% 
Jumbo 753 n.a. 903 1.100 13% 
Carrefour 6 1.110 976 908 915 (6%) 
Lidl n.a. 819 935 957 8% 
Others 5.006 5.487 5.624 5.969 6% 
Total 12.785 13.811 15.955 17.305 10% 
Exhibit 4  Portuguese M G D market 
Source: T NS, Planet Retail and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 5  Market 
Shares (2009) 
Exhibit 7 Retail Sales Index and Food & 
Beverages Inflation (YoY) 
Source: Bloomberg  
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Exhibit 8  Portuguese M G D forecasts 
Source: Nova E R Team estimates 
Source: Nova E R Team Estimates 
Exhibit 9  Portuguese M G D forecasts 
forecasts 
Source: Bloomberg 
Growth prospects 
Given the existent wealth gap between Portugal and most of its European peers, 
we believe there is still room for further growth. We have assumed a slower 
growth in the following years with the market growing only slightly above the 
expected inflation rate. The austerity plan followed by the Portuguese 
Government, combined with high unemployment rates and tougher economic 
conditions, should lead to a decrease in the consumer spending in the following 
years. Once the Portuguese economy recovers and consumer income starts 
rising again, we expect the market to accelerate its growth.  
We summarize our growth prospects for the Portuguese food retail market in the 
following table: 
 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E CAGR 
Jerónimo Martins 3.592 3.714 3.969 4.181 4.366 4.499 4.60% 
Sonae MC 3.289 3.489 3.682 3.889 4.036 4.176 4.89% 
Others 10.504 10.634 10.973 11.420 11.994 12.621 3.74% 
Total 17.385 17.834 18.624 19.490 20.396 21.296 4.14% 
 
Conclusion: we expect the market to grow at a CAGR of 4.1% until 2015, 
with both Jerónimo Martins and Sonae increasing their market shares at 
the expense of other retailers to 21% and 20%, respectively.  
B. POLAND 
As we see in Exhibit 10, the Food & Non-alcoholic beverages consumption as a 
percentage of Consumption has decreased from 21.2% in 2004 to 19.8% last 
year. However, recall that German consumers spent 15% of their overall income 
in Food & Non-alcoholic beverages last year, while British ones spent only 12%. 
Notwithstanding, such consumption has increased at an average annual growth 
rate of 5.7%7 the last decade. This means that Polish consumers have been 
allocating decreasing percentages of their incomes to food consumption as 
their purchasing power increases, leading to different and more diversified 
spending patterns.  
The Polish retail market is also highly fragmented, with as many as 42% of Poles 
shopping at self-service stores such as supermarkets and hypermarkets, 
according to a recent study issued by Pentor. That compares with 
approximately 70% in Western Europe, which leaves much room left for 
further growth as the market matures and converges to the Western 
European standards.  
                                                 
7 Source: International Monetary Fund 
Exhibit 10  Retail Sales Index and Food & 
Beverages inflation (YoY) 
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Exhibit 11 A  Market 
Share (2009)  Exhibit 12  Market Shares in the Polish M G D market 
Source: Nova E R Team Estimates 
A recent Euromonitor International report added a new piece of data supporting 
our previous conclusion by mentioning that as many as 7.000 small groceries 
closed at the end of 2008, a trend that has becoming stronger as Polish 
customers abandon shopping at traditional stores, where prices are 20% higher 
than those of discount stores. 
Besides the local retailers, some of the international retailers competing with 
Biedronka are also struggling with their lack of scale. According to the local 
press, Aldi has already slowed down its initial expansion plans as it struggles to 
compete in Poland.  
Market Size and Growth 
The Polish Modern Grocery Distribution market has been shaped by foreign 
retailers such as Metro, Jerónimo Martins, Tesco, Carrefour, Schwarz Group, 
Auchan and Rewe since 2000. Despite some signs of further market 
consolidation, the Top 5 retailers account for only 21% of the Retail Modern 
Distribution, well below the level of concentration we see in Portugal (70%) and 
other European mature markets. 
Though we recognise the market a strong potential regarding growth, the Polish 
grocery market expanded its sales at a CAGR of only 6% since 2006, well behind 
the 10% exhibited by its Portuguese peer.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we can see in Exhibit 11 A, Jerónimo Martins (Biedronka) accounted for only 
7% of the Polish MGD market in 2009, albeit the fact that it dominated 70% of its 
segment  (Hard-discount). Biedronka was also able to expand its sales at a 
CAGR of 30%, an impressive performance that was well above the second 
largest retailer (Metro Group) and the overall market. 
Despite the fact that the Polish market was fiercely hit in 2009, with overall 
sales decreasing by approximately 10%, we highlight the fact that 
Biedronka was able to grow its sales by 6% YoY8. 
 
                                                 
8 Sales already converted to the Euros. In local currency (Zloty) the sales have grown 29.8% YoY and 8.3% LFL. 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 CAGR 
Jerónimo Martins 1.636 2.295 3.398 3.596 30% 
Metro 2.065 2.531 2.851 2.381 5% 
Tesco 1.454 1.963 2.187 1.936 10% 
Schwarz G. 1.184 1.556 2.069 1.924 18% 
Carrefour 1.039 1.516 1.887 1.579 15% 
Others 37.589 41.329 47.446 42.425 4% 
Total 44.967 51.190 59.838 53.840 6% 
Source: T NS, Planet Retail 
and Nova E R Team Estimates 
 
Some of the international 
retailers are also struggling 
with their lack of scale... 
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Exhibit 13  Polish M G D market forecasts 
Source: Nova E R Team Estimates 
Exhibit 11 B  Market Share (2015)  
Growth prospects 
The Polish market was showing a solid growth till 2009, with sales growing at 
CAGR of 15% in the previous 3-year period. Despite the 10% decline in sales 
last year, we believe the market will return to its previous growth rates as Poland 
recovers from the recent crisis. 
Our optimism lies on three factors: i) excluding last year, the Polish grocery 
market was growing at double digits, ii) decrease in tween the 
country and its European peers due to the fact that the Polish economy is 
expected to outperform the Euro-zone in the following years and, iii) convergence 
of the Polish retail market to the Western European standards.   
We summarize our forecasts  for the Polish Modern Grocery Market in the 
following table:  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: we expect the Polish grocery market to expand its sales at a 
CAGR of 7.3% in the following five years, with Biedronka growing at an 
impresive CAGR of 13.3% according to our sales model. 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E CAGR 
Biedronka 4.267 5.012 5.798 6.497 7.220 7.969 13.3% 
Others 58.922 63.665 69.198 73.950 78.728 81.868 6.8% 
Total 63.189 68.677 74.996 80.447 85.948 89.837 7.3% 
Market Share 6.8% 7.3% 7.7% 8.1% 8.4% 8.9%  
Source: Nova E R Team 
Estimates 
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Exhibit 14  Sales Model (Retail Mainland) 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 15  Sales forecasts (Retail 
Mainland) 
Operational Forecasts 
A. PORTUGAL 
Retail Mainland 
In the last five years the Retail Mainland operations have been able to expand its 
sales area from 279.842m² (2004) to 434.744m² last year, representing a CAGR 
of 11.6%. Additionally, its sales grew at a CAGR of 12.8% in the same period. 
According to our forecasts, the Retail Mainland unit will slowdown its expansion 
pace through a reduction in Pingo Doce new openings. The sales area will 
expand at a modest CAGR of only 0.2%, while the Adjusted Sales per Square 
Meter9 should 
performance. 
 
Feira Nova operations, a process that involves a gradual decrease in the non-
food range and further integration under the Pingo Doce banner. The first 
conversion happened in Braga, while the second one is scheduled to open in 
Mem Mertins (Sintra) in the ending of this year, with the remaining seven 
hypermarkets being all converted in 2011. 
We believe this restructuring process will bring strong benefits for the 
Retail Mainland operations due to: (i)  
dependence on macroeconomic cycles, (ii) lower operating costs caused 
by a decrease in the sales area and, (iii) conversion into a much stronger 
and successful brand (Pingo Doce).  
Recall that the hypermarket operations were deeply affected by the competition 
coming from Sonae MC (LFL + like-for-like sales 
dropping 16% last year. Nevertheless, the hypermarket  larger focus in non-food 
goods also make it more susceptible to macroeconomic cycles, which also 
explains, though not completely, the negative performance during the recent 
crisis. 
                                                 
9 Our model takes into account the fact that the opening of a new store does not have an immediate impact in the 
kes to become fully operational 
10 Refer to previous footnote for methodology 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E  2020E CAGR  
Store Openings 10 7 6 7 3  2  
Closures 10 0 0 0 0  0  
Number of Stores 343 350 356 363 366  383  
Sales Area ( ) 434,7 435,1 418,6 425,3 428,1  444,276 0.2% 
Growth (%) 0.4% 0,1% -3,8% 1,6% 0,7%  0,4%  
Adj. Sales per SQM10  k) 6.06 6.59 7.01 7.43 7.85  9.32 4.0% 
Growth (%) (5.7%) 8,8% 6,4% 6,0% 5,7%  1.9%  
n) 2.615 2.746 2.810 3.040 3.233  3.983 3.9% 
Growth (%) 8.2% 5,5% 2,4% 7,7% 6,4%  2.3%  
We are particularly optimistic 
with the Feira 
restructuring process... 
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Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 17  Retail Mainland Forecasts 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Besides the increasing focus on food retail, the new stores will see its average 
area decrease from the initial 9.000 m² to 6.000 m², with the remaining area 
being converted in small shopping malls in order to enhance the potential number 
of clients visiting the stores.  
Our model assumes slower growth rates for the sales productivity 11 due to two 
market is already saturated, with M&A operations being highly unlikely to 
happen12. Additionally, we have assumed a higher growth rates in the next two 
years as the company fully integrates the former Plus stores, a process that we 
assumed to be completed in 2011. 
In terms of EBITDA margin for the following years, we are once again 
particularly optimistic, especially considering that the company was able to 
increase that margin by 30bp in a deeply deflationary environment such as the 
one in 2009.  
Even though we believe the worst of the deflationary environment have passed, 
analysts still expect low levels of inflation for the years to come. Together with the 
increasing competition coming from Sonae MC, we believe that Jerónimo Martins 
will have to fight hard to increase its EBITDA margin to the levels once achieved 
before the crisis.    
However, we believe that the full integration of the Plus stores and the 
sales productivity13 once restructuring is 
complete, will allow the Retail Mainland operations to gradually increase its 
EBITDA margin until it reaches 7.2% in 2012, then stabilizing around 7% in the 
long run. 
(  mn) 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Sales 2.615 2.758 2.823 3.040 3.233 3.983 3.9% 
EBITDA 183.1 195.8 201.8 218.9 231.2 278.8 3.9% 
EBITDA margin (%) 7.00% 7.10% 7.15% 7.20% 7.15% 7.0%  
Depreciation 85.8 96.5 100.2 109.4 108.3 119.5 3.1% 
EBIT 97.2 99.3 101.6 109.4 122.9 159.3 4.6% 
EBIT margin (%) 3,7% 3,6% 3,6% 3,6% 3,8% 4.0%  
 
Recheio 
We highlight the fact that the Cash & Carry chain of Jerónimo Martins was able to 
survive the recent crisis without posting negative sales growth in any of the past 
                                                 
11 
the same period. Refer to footnote 7 for methodology 
12 See  in this report for further details 
13 Refer to footnote 7 for methodology 
Exhibit 16  Sales vs. E B IT D A margin 
forecasts (Retail Mainland) 
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Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 19  Sales Model (Recheio) 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Source: Company Data and Nova 
E R Team Estimates 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 21  Recheio Forecasts 
3-years. Since 2006 the wholesaler managed to grow its sales at a CAGR of 
5.0%, while its sales productivity grew at a CAGR of 2.4%. 
In anticipation of the difficulties in both the segments it operates 
(Traditional Retail and HoReCa) and the recent deflationary environment, 
and the launching of a private brand for the Traditional Retail.  
Additionally, we expect Recheio to increase the number of stores to 40 in the 
next three years and then remain stable until 2020. Recall that even considering 
that Recheio emerged stronger from the recent crisis, the market is still a highly 
mature one, with no room left for significant growth. Therefore, we expect 
Recheio to increase its sales area at a CAGR of only 1.4% in the next ten years. 
In terms of sales productivity, we forecasted a moderate CAGR of only 1.8%, 
reflecting both a saturated market and a weaker demand. 
Concluding, we expect sales to grow at a CAGR of 3.1%, below its recent 
performance and only slightly above the long-term inflation rate of 2% in 
Portugal14. 
 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Store Openings 0 2 2 1 0 0  
Closures 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Number of Stores 35 37 39 40 40 40  
Sales Area ( ) 114,410 122,766 129,402 132,720 132,720 132,720 1.4% 
Growth (%) (1.1%) 7.3% 5.4% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0%  
Adj. Sales per SQM15  k) 5.95 6.02 6.14 6.27 6.39 7.26 1.8% 
Growth (%) 2.4% 1.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9%  
n) 664.8 710.8 764.8 800.3 816.2 927.5 3.1% 
Growth (%) 5.3% 6.9% 7.6% 4.6% 2.0% 1.7%  
 
Regarding EBITDA margin, we expect it to increase by 10 bps this year and then 
remain stable over the following years. Overall, EBITDA is expected to grow at a 
CAGR of 2.7% in our 10-year forecast period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
14 Recall that all CAGR are Nominal growth rates, which means they already include the expected inflation rate 
15
  Refer to footnote 7 for methodology 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Sales 664.8 710.8 764.8 800.3 816.2 927.5 3.1% 
EBITDA 39.9 43.4 46.7 48.8 49.8 56.6 3.2% 
EBITDA margin (%) 6.0% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1%  
Depreciation 8.0 9.9 10.7 11.2 12.2 13.9 5.2% 
EBIT 31.9 34.1 35.9 37.6 37.5 42.7 2.7% 
EBIT margin (%) 4.8% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4,6% 4,6%  
Exhibit 18  Sales vs. Sales productivity 
forecasts (Recheio) 
Exhibit 20  E B I T D A Forecasts (Recheio) 
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Exhibit 22  Sales Model (Madei ra) 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 23  Madeira Forecasts 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Madeira 
According to our forecasts, the business will suffer a slowdown due to the floods 
that recently hit the island, which led to the temporary closure of two 
supermarkets. 
 We expect this impact to be only temporary, with the business unit back on track 
in the following years, in line with our previous forecasts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We highlight the fact that this extraordinary event will certainly affect the 
current EBITDA margin, causing a decrease of 20 bps from 4.8% in the 
previous year to 4.6%. We then expect it to gradually increase until it remains 
stable around 5.0% in 2013. 
  
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Sales 127.0 123.1 126.1 128.6 131.4 150.6 1.6% 
EBITDA 6.1 5.7 6.2 6.3 6.6 7.5 1.9% 
EBITDA margin (%) 4.80% 4.60% 4.90% 4.90% 5.00% 5.00%  
Depreciation 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.1 13.4% 
EBIT 5.6 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.4 (3.7%) 
EBIT margin (%) 4.3% 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 3.6%  
   
Regarding sales, we expect the company to maintain the current sales area, with 
no store openings scheduled for the future in our sales model. The sales are 
expected to grow at a CAGR of 1.6% until 2020, below the 5.3% level exhibited 
between 2004 and the 2009.  
B. POLAND 
Biedronka 
its consolidated sales last year and approximately half of its reported EBITDA. 
Management has recently unveiled its long-term prospects for Biedronka 
besides the 2.000 stores target for 2012, now setting the 3.000 stores as the 
new objective for 2020. 
network expansion, we believe this is a perfectly reachable long-term objective. 
  
                                                 
16 Refer to footnote 7 for methodology 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Store Openings 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Closures 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Number of Stores 15 15 15 15 15 15  
Sales Area ( ) 14,626 14,300 14,300 14,300 14,300 14,300 0.0% 
Growth (%) (2.2%) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Adj. Sales per SQM16  k) 9.15 8.95 9.17 9.35 9.55 10.95 1.6% 
Growth (%) 4.3% (2.2%) 2.5% 2.0% 2.1% 1.9%  
n) 127.0 123.1 126.1 128.6 131.4 150.6 1.6% 
Growth (%) 5.25% 6.92% 7.59% 4.64% 2.0% 1.7%  
We expect a temporary 
decrease of 20 bps in the 
EBITDA margin this year... 
...and the business back 
on track in the following 
years... 
Exhibit 24  Sales vs. Sales productivity 
forecasts (Biedronka)  
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Source: Company Data and  Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
  
Exhibit 26  Sales Model (Biedronka) 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
In Emergent Market, the percentage of stores in which the retailer actually own 
the space is particularly high, resulting in higher costs than if the company could 
simply rent the space. Poland is no exception and Biedronka currently owns 88% 
of its 1.466 stores. Our model assumes a gradual improvement until the 
company is able to own only 50% of its stores in the long run, exactly the 
sort of weights between owned and leased stores we observe in more 
developed markets such as Portugal17. This had two consequences in our 
expenditures as the cost of a new store through leasing is 50% lower18.  
We highlight the fact that the partnership Biedronka has celebrated with its 
suppliers implies that they have constant knowledge 
plans, so that they can be ready and participate in such decisions. Consequently, 
 
Concluding, we expect the company to fulfil its business plan concerning 
the network expansion, increasing the number of stores by 697 until 2012 
and boosting its sales area at a CAGR of 12.4%. We then forecast a 
il it reaches 3.000 
-year 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of EBITDA margin, we expect an increase until it reaches 7.5% in 
2012, then our model assumes it will gradually decrease to 7.1%, a long-
term range slightly higher than the one provided by the company. 
lack of strong competition and (iii), expansion in Private Label products. 
                                                 
17 According to company data the weights are precisely 50% in the Portuguese market 
18 owns the space  
19 Refer to footnote 7 for methodology 
20 Refer to footnote 7 for methodology 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Store Openings 163 170 178 186 160 90  
Closures (53) 0 0 0 0 0  
Number of Stores 1.466 1.636 1.814 2.000 2.160 3.000  
Sales Area ( ) 852,6 971,6 1096,2 1226,4 1338,4 1926,4 7.7% 
Growth (%) 13.1% 14.0% 12.8% 11.9% 9.1% 3.4%  
Adj. Sales per SQM19 (Pln k) 22.3 23.8 25.4 27.1 28.8 40.6 5.6% 
Growth (%) 7.0% 6.7% 7.1% 6.6% 6.2% 4.3%  
EUR/PLN 4.16 3.98 4.09 4.32 4.44 4.85 1.4% 
Adj. Sales per SQM20 (  k) 5.13 5.97 6.22 6.28 6.48 8.38 4.6% 
Growth (%) (9.1%) 16.3% 4.2% 0.9% 3.3% 4.9%  
  mn) 3596.5 4266.6 5012.3 5798.3 6496.8 10671.5 10.4% 
Growth (%) 5.8% 18.6% 17.5% 15.7% 12.0% 5.0%  
The weights between owned 
and leased stores equal 50% 
in mature markets... 
Exhibit 25  # Stores Evolution 
(Biedronka)  
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Source: PM R Research 
Exhibit 28  Biedronka Forecasts 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
 We recall here that Biedronka already has 60% of its offer as Private Label 
products, which we assumed to increase its growth potential both in sales 
and EBITDA margins. 
The Private Label products are gradually increasing their market share in Poland 
due to three main factors: i) toughening economic conditions, ii) the rising 
availability of such products and, iii) increasing confidence regarding their quality. 
Additionally, the economic downturn has also pushed many Polish consumers 
towards limiting expenditure even on basic and non-essential goods, making 
private label products an increasingly popular option. According to a recent study 
issued by Planet Retail, the Polish Private Label market accounted for 11% of the 
Modern Grocery Distribution sales in 2009, well below the 34% market share we 
observe in Portugal and the 40% in Germany. 
Therefore, we expect the Private Label retail market to remain growing at 
double digits in the following years as the market converges to the Western 
European standards. 
.   
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Sales 3.596 4.267 5.012 5798 6.497 10.671 10.4% 
EBITDA 262.5 315.7 370.9 434.9 487.3 779 10.4% 
EBITDA margin (%) 7.3% 7.4% 7.4% 7.5% 7.5% 7.1%  
Depreciation 68.4 81.1 95.2 116.0 130.0 149.4 9.8% 
EBIT 194.1 234.7 275.7 318.9 357.3 586.9 10.6% 
EBIT margin (%) 5.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5%  
 
Conclusion: hard-discount operations account for 8% of the overall retail 
market, with Biedronka currently dominating 70% of that segment. Given 
the fact that it has already achieved the larger scale by far within its 
segment, we believe that Biedronka will keep outperforming the market and 
competitors in the following years. 
 
  
Exhibit 27  What is the shop you 
visited most frequently? (Poland) 
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Source: PM R Research 
Exhibit 30  Industry Forecasts 
Exhibit 31  Services Forecasts 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Industry  
costumers experience a significant erosion of their purchasing power and 
become extremely price sensitive, private label assumes an essential role 
through their low cost profile. Due to the expected decreasing disposable 
incomes, we expect the Portuguese customers to reduce their expenditure in 
premium products, therefore increasing the competition faced by the Industry 
business.  
Therefore, we have assumed cautious forecasts, with sales growing at a 
CAGR of only 2.3% until 2020, slightly above the expected long term GDP 
growth.  
 
 
 
 
In terms of EBITDA margins we expect the unit to remain the most profitable one 
since costumers are always willing to pay a higher price for a premium brand 
they are familiar with. We also expect the EBITDA margin to gradually decrease 
due to the fierce competition from Private Label, until it remains stable around 
14.6%. 
 
Services 
We expect Services to grow its sales at a CAGR of 4.3%, mostly due to the 
expansion to new formats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of EBITDA margins we expect them to remain perfectly stable around 
the 2.2% in the medium and long term. 
58.8% 
 
 
 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Sales 229.6 231.0 235.5 240.3 246.4 293.9 2.3% 
EBITDA 35.1 35.1 35.8 36.3 36.7 42.9 1.8% 
EBITDA margin (%) 15.3% 15.2% 15.2% 15.1% 14.9% 14.6%  
Depreciation 3.4 3.0 3.3 3.1 2.7 4.7 3.0% 
EBIT 31.7 32.1 32.5 33.2 34.0 38.2 1.7% 
EBIT margin (%) 13.8% 13.9% 13.8% 13.8% 13.8% 13.0%  
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Sales 84.2 87.2 89.3 94.8 100.2 138.1 4.6% 
EBITDA 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 7.7% 
EBITDA margin (%) 15.3% 15.2% 15.2% 15.1% 14.9% 14.6%  
Depreciation 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.9 4.6% 
EBIT (0.4) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 n.a. 
EBIT margin (%) (29.4%) 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%  
Industry should be 
competition.... 
Exhibit 29  Private Label Acceptance 
rate by country 
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Exhibit 32  Capex Breakdown (2009) 
Source: Company Data  
Exhibit 33  Capital Expenditures Forecasts 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 34  Revamping vs Expansion 
Capex 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 35  Capital Expenditures B reakdown - Forecasts 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Addressing the cost of growth  
The company recently unveiled its capex plans for the next three years, with an 
and, according to our own forecasts, Jerónimo Martins will spend approximately 
the 2.000 stores target for Biedronka in 2012.  
Our model have assumed three sorts of Capital Expenditures for Jerónimo 
Martins: (i) Expansion, (ii) Revamping, (iii) Conversion and, (iv) Distribution 
Centers. Recall that the Conversion capex is merely temporary as the 
company still focuses on the former Plus stores conversion, a process we 
assumed to be completed by 2011. Regarding Industry & Services we 
assumed a capex in order with company  own estimates.  
 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2020E CAGR 
Distribution Centers 40.0 40.1 40.2 29.2 30.1 24.7 (4.7%) 
Expansion 232.0 246.5 268.6 224.8 232.5 152.2 (4.1%) 
Revamping 111.9 122.7 134.7 159.0 170.4 245.6 8.2% 
Conversion 47.9 97.2 0 0 0 0  
Industry & Services 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 2.0% 
Total Capex 436.7 511.7 448.7 418.3 438.4 428.6 (0.2%) 
Capex/Sales 5.3% 5.7% 4.4% 3.8% 3.7% 2.7%  
 
Last year the company reported that Biedronka accounted for 58.4% of the 
 mn. We expect that share to suffer a significant 
increase as Jerónimo Martins focuses its attention in the Polish market, with 
Biedronka expected to account for 66% of the overall investment in 2010. 
Recall that our model assumes Biedronka will grow its sales area at a CAGR of 
12% in the following three-year period, which will increase the capital 
expenditures until it reaches 5.7% of sales in 2011. Since we have assumed a 
 network expansion from 2013 onwards, 
the Capex to Sales ratio is expected to gradually decrease until it reaches 2.7% 
in the end of our forecast period.  
Additionally, we expect the Revamping Capex to increase at a CAGR of 8.2% as 
the company increases the number of stores it operates and, consequently, has 
to increase its refurbishments. According to our model the Revamping Capex will 
finally overcome the Expansion one in 2016 (see Exhibit 34). 
We summarize our conclusions in Exhibit 35: 
 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2020E CAGR 
Retail Mainland 131.4 179.2 88.6 85.3 87.6 113.4 (1.5%) 
Biedronka 289.9 316.6 345.4 320.1 337.7 300.3 0.4% 
Recheio 7.8 8.2 6.9 5.1 5.2 5.8 (1.5%) 
Madeira 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.9 1.1% 
Industry & Services 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 2.0% 
Total Capex 436.7 511.7 448.7 418.3 438.4 428.6 (0.2%) 
Biedronka should account 
for the majority of the 
Capex in the following 
years....  
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Exhibit 36  Leverage Position 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 37  Net Wor king Capital Breakdown 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 38  Leverage Position Breakdown 
De-levering process... 
operations, the company will be able to dilute the large investments made in 
store openings and distribution centers. 
The reduction in capital expenditures related to expansion, together with 
continued working capital improvements, should allow Jerónimo Martins to 
proceed with an aggressive delivering process.  
In terms of Working Capital we assumed the company will receive from 
customers in 9 days, whereas paying its suppliers in 102 days in 2010. In the 
long term we expect the company to achieve a receivables turnover of 8 days 
and a payables turnover of 104. We were also optimistic regarding Inventory 
Turnover, assuming the company will achieve a 20 days inventory period, which 
will then gradually decrease until it stabilizes around 18 days.  
performance, improving 8 working capital days since 2004 and, (ii) the increase 
ower over its suppliers and 
customers.  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Long Term 
Inventory Period 27.7 28.9 26.4 26.0 25.2 20.6 18 
Receivables Turnover 11.8 12.6 11.5 10.5 9.2 9.5 8 
Payables Turnover 103.9 105.4 107.6 108.7 101.8 101.5 104 
NWC in Days (50) (49) (53) (57) (54) (58) (62) 
 
Recall that we have assumed Jerónimo Martins to improve its creditor terms in 
our ten-year forecast period. As mentioned, the continued improvement in 
significant reduction in its Cost of Debt. 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E CAGR 
Net Debt 689.3 676.2 700.4 652.0 601.0 562.4 (1.8%) 
Net Working Capital (1.161) (1.296) (1.435) (1.602) (1.776) (2.750) 7.8% 
NWC in days (58) (58) (58) (58) (59) (62)  
Gearing (%) 65% 57% 52% 45% 40% 33%  
Interest Coverage 5.1 13.3 13.2 13.7 14.4 19.3 13.5%  
Even though the macroeconomic picture in Portugal is getting darker over the 
past few months, we believe that this de-levering process is not directly related 
with such economic deterioration. 
We highlight the fact that, despite the aggressive expansion in Poland, 
Biedronka has already achieved a great deal of consolidation, leading to 
strong generation of Cash-Flows that allow it to finance its own expansion 
without the need of support from the Head Office. 
Biedronka generates most 
Cash Flow...  
We expect further 
improvements in NWC...  
The company should 
achieve better creditor 
terms in the future...  
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Our analysis led to a 
Synthetic Rating of A... 
Exhibit 39  B F V E UR Industrial rates 
Source: Bloomberg 
Exhibit 40  Moody's Rating Methodology 
Source: Moody's " G lobal Retail Industry "  
Exhibit 41  Moody's Rating Methodology 
Source: Moody's " G lobal Retail Industry "  
 ...and reduction in the Cost of Debt  
According to our initial analysis the company had a pre-tax Cost of Debt of 5.85% 
for its Portuguese operations and 6.96% for Biedronka21. However, these 
estimates were too conservative as we expect the company to improve its 
financial and liquidity position in the following years, leading to an expected lower 
cost of debt.  
decided to compute a synthetic rating for Jerónimo Martins based on the 
methodology used 22.  We conducted a quick and straightforward 
analysis of commonalities and differences in the credit ratings assigned to 
comparable companies in order to find the appropriate pre-tax Cost of Debt for 
Jerónimo Martins. 
In order to attribute such rating we took into account six key rating factors, which 
were then divided into different sub-factors, each one with different weights. After 
computing a rating for each of the sub-factors (see Appendix- Rating 
Methodology for further details) we achieved the following results: 
                                   
Rating Factors Sub-Factors Weights Ratings 
Business & CF Volatility 
Product Volatility 6.0%       Aa 
Geographic Diversification 4.0% A 
Seasonality of CFOs 3.0% A 
Market Positioning 
Scale 10.0%      Baa 
Market Share & Comp. Position 10.0%       A 
Cost Efficiency and Profitability 6.5%       A 
Execution Ability Quality of Merchandising 5.0%       Aaa Supply Chain 7.0%       Aa 
Real Estate Assets Positioning Investments in Store Quality 2.5%  B Barriers to Entry 5.0%  B 
Financial Policy / Liquidity  8.0%       Aa 
Key Indicator Ratios 
Debt/EBITDA 8.0%       Aa 
RCF/Net Debt 8.0%       Aa 
EBITDA/Interest 7.0%       Aaa 
FCF/Net Debt 3.0%       Aaa 
CFO/Debt 7.0%       Aaa 
  
Conclusion: Jerónimo Martins has an overall implicit rating of A, which 
allows us to compute the correspondent Cost of Debt using the BFV Euro 
Industrial rates for such rating taking into account the 10 year forecast 
period of our analysis (see Exhibit 39). 
                                                 
21 Source: Company Data and Analyst Estimates 
22 Rating Methodology  Global Retail Industry , 2006 
23 Arithmetic Average of the last one year period using daily data  
Ratings Weights Dist. of Scores Weighted Score Indicated Rating Overall Score 
Aaa 22.0% 1 0.22 Aaa 1.49 or lower 
Aa 37.0% 3 1.11 Aa 1.5 to 4.49 
A 23.5% 6 1.41 A 4.5 to 7.49 
Baa 10.0% 9 0.90 Baa 7.50 to 10.49 
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4.12% 23   Overall Score 4.77 
gy 
for Retail companies... 
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Exhibit 42  D C F Assumptions 
Source: Nova E R Team Analysis 
Valuation Summary 
In terms of Betas24, we divided the companies further analyzed at Comparables 
into two different sub-groups: (i) European retailers with exposure to Emergent 
Markets and, (ii) European retailers with low or even no exposure at all to 
Emergent Markets. Biedronka was valued using the first group, while the 
Portuguese operations remained with the second one. 
Even though we believe the market is currently overreacting regarding the 
probability of default for Portugal, we believe that the Market Premium assumed 
in the previous analysis is now a too conservative one given the darker 
macroeconomic picture. We recall that the Market Premium reflects fundamental 
judgments we make about how much risk we observe in the Economy and what 
is the price that comes attached to such observed risk. If the Market Premium 
rises, then investors will immediately charge a higher price for that risk and 
demand to pay lower prices for the same set of risky expected cash flows.  
Therefore, we calculated the Country Risk Premium using the 10 year Credit 
Default Spreads adjusted for the Volatilities of both the Equity Index and the 
 10 year bonds25. Finally, as a proxy for Risk-free, we used the 10-year 
German Sovereign Bond for Portuguese operations and the 10-year Polish 
26. 
We summarize our Discounted Cash-Flow (DCF) assumptions in Exhibit 42: 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 The beta of each company in the industry was calculated as = ( ; )/ ( ), using 4 years of 
weekly data 
25 We expect the Country Risk Premium to be higher than the country default risk spread, so:    =
             /            
26 Since its cash flows are in the local currency (Zloty) 
27 We assumed to be 4%, which is in line with current financial theory 
28 Basically, we assume that       =       +        
29 =   /( + )  , assuming the Beta of debt as zero 
30 Using the same formula mentioned in the previous footnote 
31    = + (    ) 
32 Euribor 
Investor Relations Office, we have assumed the unit pays 50 bps higher for its Debt 
33 = ( +    + +       ) 
 Portugal  Madeira Poland Terminal Growth Rates 
Risk-Free 3.2% 3.2% 5.8% Retail Mainland 2.0% 
Mature Market Premium 27 4.0%  4.0% 4.0% Real Growth Rate 0.0% 
Country Premium 2.3% 2.3% 3.2% Long Term Inflation 2.0% 
Market Premium 28 6.3% 6.3% 7.2% Recheio 2.0% 
Beta Unlevered 29 0.53 0.53 0.50 Real Growth Rate 0.0% 
Beta levered 30 0.77 0.77 0.75 Long Term Inflation 2.0% 
Cost of Equity 31 7.8%   7.8%   9.6% Madeira 2.0% 
Pre-tax Cost of Debt 4.2% 4.2% 4.7%32 Real Growth Rate 0.0% 
Tax Rate 26.5% 25% 19% Long Term Inflation 2.0% 
After-tax Cost of Debt 3.1% 3.1% 3.8% Biedronka 2.5% 
Target D/E 60% 60% 60% Real Growth Rate 0.0% 
D/(D+E) 38% 38% 38% Long Term Inflation 2.5% 
WACC 33 6.2% 6.2% 8.4% Ind. & Services 2.0% 
We analyzed each of our DCF 
assumptions with a 
significant impact in our 
Price Target of /sh...  
 
We expect the domestic 
operations to grow in line 
with long term inflation... 
 
We updated our Market 
Premium assumptions for 
both Portugal and Poland.... 
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Exhibit 43  S-o-P Breakdown 
Exhibit 44  Sum-of-the-parts Valuation Breakdown 
Source: Nova E R Team Analysis Source: Nova E R Team Analysis 
Sum-of-the-Parts  
Finally, we are now able to value Jerónimo Martins using the sum-of-the-parts 
valuation method in order to consolidate all the six units we have analyzed so far. 
As shown in Exhibit 42, we assumed all the Portuguese operations to have a 
terminal growth rate in line with the expected long-term inflation rate of 2% per 
annum. 
In Poland we decided to proceed cautiously, with the terminal growth rate being 
set in line with our inflation forecast of 2.5%. We recall that our base scenario 
does not incorporate a possible adoption of the Euro in Poland, which 
would decrease the expected inflation rate to the one set by the European 
Central Bank, among several other impacts.  This means we are not 
incorporating any possible expansion benefits in our valuation of Biedronka, 
therefore assuming there will be no store openings from 2020 onwards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We also highlight the fact that Biedronka accounts for 67% of our S-o-P 
valuation, which means Jerónimo Martins is now much more levered to the 
dynamics of the Polish market than to its highly mature domestic market.  
Peer group comparison 
We have also cross checked our sum-of-the-parts valuation with market multiples 
associated with comparable companies. The idea behind such rationale is to 
compare JMT with its peers taking into account two sorts of peer groups: (i) 
Eastern and Central European food retailers that exhibit significant growth 
prospects due to their exposure to emergent markets similar to Poland and, (ii) 
Western European food retailers, whose growth prospects are at least limited 
since they are mostly exposed to mature markets with high penetration rates 
such as the Portuguese one. 
In order to compute the implicit price through Multiple Comparison we have 
attributed to the Emergent retailers the same weight we applied to Biedronka in 
our sum-of-the-parts valuation (see Exhibit 43). 
 EV Stake Attrib. To JM % 
Retail Mainland 1.778 51% 907 17% 
Recheio 605 100% 605 11% 
Madeira 
Retail Portugal 
Industry 
100.1 
2.484 
477 
75,5% 
45% 
76 
1.588 
215 
1% 
29% 
4% 
Services 
Industry & Services 
Retail Poland 
14 
491 
3.664 
51% 
100% 
7 
222 
3.664 
0% 
4% 
67% 
Enterprise Value   5.454 100% 
Consolidated Net Debt   (676)  
Debt Attributable to Minorities   251  
Financial Investments   72  
Equity Value   5.101  
Shares (mn)   628  
Price Target     
We compared Jerónimo 
Martins with other retail 
companies... 
 
Our base scenario does not 
include the Polish Euro 
adoption.... 
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Exhibit 45  Relative Valuation 
Source: Bloomberg Consensus 
By applying the 67% weight to the Emergent Retailers we have achieved the 
following conclusions: 
  
We highlight the fact that if we had used the Bloomberg Consensus EV/EBITDA 
from the Emergent category to value Biedronka we would get a new Price Target 
/sh, which is 11% higher than ours. 
Concluding, our sum-of-the-parts valuation seems to be in line with this relative 
valuation through Multiples. According to our analysis Jerónimo Martins is 
trading at a premium compared to the Western retail sector, which we 
believe to be perfectly 
impressive growth potential. 
Regarding the Emergent category we observe precisely the opposite, which is 
also justifiable given their higher expected EPS growth for the next three-year 
period. Recall that we expect Jerónimo Martins to increase its EPS at a CAGR of 
13% in the next four years, a number clearly above the Western retailers but still 
far away from Eastern and Central European retailers that are 100% focused on 
emergent markets. 
Risks to our Analysis 
We believe the main risk to our Valuation analysis would be the Euro 
adhesion of Poland, which would significantly change our Price Target in a way 
that we will further analyze in this report. Additionally, our valuation is also highly 
dependent on the evolution of the Zloty as it substantially impacts our DCF 
calculations for Biedronka. 
In terms of Portugal the main risk would be a scenario in which the country 
would be forced to leave the European Union. Even though we are no experts 
in macro economy, we consider such scenario as highly unlikely to happen.  
 
   EPS P/E EV/EBITDA 
   10E 11E 12E 13E CAGR 10E 11E 12E 13E 10E 11E 12E 13E 
Tesco 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.47 11% 14.7 13.3 11.9 10.6 9.6 8,7 8,1 7,2 
Carrefour 2.33 2.78 3.19 3.64 16% 16.5 13.8 12.1 10.6 8.0 7,3 6,7 6,1 
Metro 2.85 3.51 4.06 4.56 17% 15.8 12.8 11.1 9.9 5.4 4,9 4,4 4,2 
Ahold 0.84 0.93 1.03 1.09 9% 12.0 10.8 9.8 9.2 6.0 5,7 5,4 5,2 
Casino 5.09 5.72 6.25 6.73 10% 12.8 11.4 10.5 9.7 6.6 6,2 5,8 5,6 
Sainsbury 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.35 10% 15.1 14.0 12.6 11.2 7.2 6,7 6,1 5,7 
Delhaize 5.37 5.83 6.27 6.13 4.5% 11.5 10.6 9.9 10.1 5.6 5,3 5,0 5,0 
Morrison 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.31 13% 14.7 12.8 11.6 10.7 7.9 7,1 6,5 6,1 
Colruyt 10.30 11.24 12.07 13.14 8% 17.9 16.4 15.3 14.0 10.1 9,3 8,8 8,0 
Mature     11% 14.5 12.9 11.6 10.6 7.4 6.8 6.3 5.9 
X5 Group 1.02 1.45 2.00 2.43 34% 26.3 18.6 13.5 11.0 11.4 9.0 7.4 6.4 
Magnit 3.26 4.25 5.31 6.63 27% 20.1 15.4 12.3 9.9 11.5 8.7 7.1 6.0 
BIM 1.59 1.84 2.20 2.11 10% 26.1 22.3 18.1 18.9 17.2 14.3 12.4 11.5 
Emergent     23% 24.2 18.2 14.6 13.3 13.4 10.7 9.0 8.0 
Weighted Multiples     19% 21 16.8 13.6 12.4 11.4 9.4 8.1 7.3 
Nova ER      11% 20.0 17.7 15.7 14.3 9.1 8.2 7.3 6.7 
JMT is trading at a premium 
with Western retailers... 
 
...and at discount relative to 
retailers focused only on 
Emergent markets... 
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Exhibit 46  E V Breakdown 
Source: Nova E R Team Analysis 
Does Minipreço really make sense... 
According to information recently released by the Press, Carrefour is ready to sell 
its Minipreço stores and definitely exit Portugal after selling its hypermarkets to 
Sonae in 2007 fo  
By analyzing the Western retailers, more specifically the ones with very low 
or no exposure at all to emergent markets, we get an average EV/Sales34 
35
 However, we highlight 
-6.9% LFL growth in 2009) should probably 
lead to a discount in order to attract potential buyers. 
However, we believe Jerónimo Martins would not be interested in such deal for 
three main reasons: (i) the company is now focused in consolidating Poland and 
finding a new international market to expand to, (ii) regulators would certainly 
impose restrictions and, (iii) significant operational differences with Pingo Doce. 
Despite the fact that Jerónimo Martins could easily get the funds needed for such 
operation, we recall that the company recently unveiled its plans for an 
international expansion that will certainly be made through acquisitions, which 
could implicate a significant financial effort. Additionally, we also highlight  that 
the 524 Minipreço stores have an average area of only 500m², which clearly 
contrasts with the average 950m² for the stores under the Pingo Doce banner. 
Finally, the regulator would certainly impose serious restrictions since Jerónimo 
Martins and Sonae MC already control 38% of the Portuguese Market. 
...With 49% of JMR so close?  
We are also sceptic regarding such deal since the company could get a higher 
return by simply acquiring the remaining 49% of JMR that belongs to the Ahold.  
According to our sum-of-the-parts valuation, the Retail Mainland Operations have 
considering its significant growth prospects. However, the EV/EBITDA Multiple 
we find in the market for retailers focused only on mature markets yields only 7.3, 
which means that Retail Mainland would then have an Enterprise Value of only 
   
Thus, we believe the company could buy the 49% stake for an EV 
significantly lower than its intrinsic value. Such deal would be made between 
the EV/EBITDA multiples we mentioned before, which lead us to an Enterprise 
potential for value creation in this deal, we believe the company will not proceed 
with such operation as it implies a significant financial effort that could eventually 
compromise its international expansion through acquisitions.   
                                                 
34 We used EV/Sales instead of EV/EBITDA since Carrefour does not disclose that such information 
35 Our analysis included the following companies: Ahold, Sainsbury, Delhaize and Morrison 
underperformance would 
lead to a discount.... 
 
The Minipreço stores have an 
average area of only 500m²... 
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Polish Euro Adhesion 
As mentioned, we have not included such scenario in our analysis due to the 
impossibility of quantifying certain issues that would certainly cause a bias in our 
sum-of-the-parts valuation. 
The first issue would be the year in which Poland would finally adopt the Euro 
currency. The previous Euro adoption target of 2012 was abandoned as the 
public deficit rose and the zloty tumbled with the financial crisis. The Polish 
government recently mentioned 2015 as a possible new target date. 
However, this data could be once again delayed as the European Union 
struggles to maintain stability and solving its own existent problems.  
Recall that  in 2009 and is expected to be 
around 7% in 2010 as the government maintains high spending levels in order to 
keep the economy on track. According to the OECD, the macro-policy followed 
by the polish was largely appropriate as the sharp depreciation of the polish 
currency cushioned the impact of foreign shock, though it led to the consequent 
postponement of euro adoption. 
Secondly, it is impossible for us to accurately forecast the equilibrium 
exchange rate between the Zloty and the Euro in 2015. Even though we could 
assume the exchange rate observed in the market, we believe that would always 
be a noisy approximation. Recall that several economists have already criticised 
the exchange rate applied to Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece. Additionally, 
we believe the European Union will be particularly rigid in this issue so that it 
does not make the same mistakes that could eventually put the UE once again in 
danger of a possible breakdown. 
Our Analysis 
Even though we consider this scenario analysis as a simple approximation to 
reality, we decided to analyze the impact in our sum-of-the-parts valuation of a 
possible Euro adoption in 2015. 
Besides assuming 2015 as the real target, we have also assumed the exchange 
rate of that year as the equilibrium one, which means it will remain the same from 
2015 onwards. Recall that the EUR/PLN forward rates used to discount 
Euro, meaning that a fixed exchange rate will always have a positive effect in our 
sum-of-the-parts valuation. 
Then we divided Biedronka into two sorts of Free-Cash Flows: (i) until 2014 
and, (ii) 2015 onwards, including the perpetuity. The second set of cash 
flows were discounted using a new WACC that reflected the necessary 
differences in both the Cost of Debt and the Risk-Free.  
target for Euro adoption is 
now 2015... 
It would be impossible for us 
to forecast the exact 
equilibrium exchange rate for 
 
We divided Biedronka into 
two sorts of Cash Flows: 
before and after Euro 
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Exhibit 47  Biedronka E V Scenario 
Analysis 
Source: Nova E R Team Analysis 
Exhibit 48  Sensitivity Analysis 
Source: Nova E R Team Analysis 
The Cost of Debt would be the same one applied in the Portuguese operations 
since Jerónimo Martins would no longer have part of its debt in Zlotys. Regarding 
Risk-free, we used the 10y German Government Bonds due to the fact that 
would then be in Euros instead of Zlotys.  
Therefore, the first set of cash flows were discounted using our previous WACC 
of 8.4%, while in the second ones we have used a new WACC of only 6.6%36. 
Additionally, the Terminal Value would then consider a Terminal Growth 
rate of 2%, 50 bps lower that our previous one, reflecting a long term 
inflation rate set accordingly  for 
the Euro countries37.  
As we can see in Exhibit 47, Biedronka would increase its Enterprise Value by 
40%, reflecting a stronger exchange rate and a lower WACC used to discount its 
Free Cash Flows. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We also proceeded with a sensitivity analysis regarding the year in which Poland 
would finally adopt the Euro. As expected, a delay of the Polish Euro adhesion in 
our model decreases the  (2015) 
assume Poland to adopt the Euro currency only in 2020.  We summarize our 
findings in the following table: 
 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 
Biedronka EV 5.108 5.058 5.022 4.967 4.928 4.899 
Total EV 6.918 6.868 6.833 6.777 6.738 6.709 
Equity value 6.565 6.515 6.479 6.424 6.385 6.356 
Implied Price Target /share) 10.45 10.37 10.31 10.22 10.16 10.11 
 
 
Conclusion: Our Price Target would increase 
potential upside would then be 55% if Poland adheres to the Euro currency 
in 2015. As we delay such scenario in our model the impact on our sum-of-
the-parts valuation is reduced until it represents an upside of 39% over the 
stock c
                                                 
36 Even though we have assumed the Market Premium to remain the same, this is not completely accurate since the 
adoption of the Euro would make Poland less risky, which would then lead to a lower market premium 
37 Recall that a lower inflation also decreases  due to its significant impact on 
sales growth 
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Exhibit 49 Cumulative Returns 
Source: Bloomberg 
Exhibit 50 Return on Equity 
Source: Company Data and Bloomberg 
Consensus 
Exhibit 51 R O I C vs. W A C C (%) 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Is Jerónimo Martins really creating value? 
The purpose here is to infer if the company is really creating value when 
compared with the Market and Comparable companies. 
We started by assuming that a firm whose stock has gone up is viewed as having 
created value, whereas one whose stock price has fallen has then destroyed 
value. As we can see in Exhibit 49, the company clearly beat the Portuguese 
and European Indexes since 2004, achieving a cumulative return of 144%38. 
Since the BEFOODR index already includes the main European retailers, we can 
also conclude that the company beat its competitors as well. 
 Even though the creation of value seems obvious, stock prices can fluctuate 
around the true value of a company for quite long time, which means that market 
returns can also be noisy.  
We have also analyzed the Return on Equity (RoE) ratios of both Jerónimo 
Martins and similar companies within the retail industry. Though it seems 
obvious that Jerónimo Martins is creating value according to a RoE 
comparison (Exhibit 50), we highlight the fact that the differences may 
simply reflect different accounting standards between countries. 
Therefore, we have extended our analysis to the Return on Invested Capital 
(ROIC), which we believe to be critical when comparing the profitability of 
different companies across the same industry. 
Since we valued Biedronka with a different cost of capital (WACC), we divided 
Jerónimo Martins into two different parts. Furthermore, we have considered 
 mn last year, with the remaining amount 
 mn) being related to Portugal39.  
Assuming that a company is creating value whenever its WACC is higher 
than the ROIC, we can observe in Exhibit 51 that Jerónimo Martins, both in 
Portugal and through Biedronka, is actually creating value. Magnit and BIM40 
had the higher creation of value among the industry due to their higher focus on 
Emergent market, where the growth prospects are far brighter than the ones faced 
by retailers struggling with their highly mature domestic markets.  
 
Conclusion: whatever criteria we had used in this analysis it seems obvious 
that Jerónimo Martins is in fact creating value, though it did not achieve the 
Value Creation exhibited by some of its Emergent peers. 
 
                                                 
38 Price data adjusted for Dividends and stock splits; 
39 Using company data provided by the Investor Relations Office 
40 Despite the fact that it is not present in Exhibit 51, BIM had a ROIC of 45% against the 6% of its WACC 
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Exhibit 52  Brazilian M D G Market 
Source: T NS, Planet Retail and Nova E R Team Estimates 
Source: T NS, Planet Retail and Nova E R Team Estimates 
Exhibit 53 Brazilian M G D market Forecasts 
New Internationalization...  
company is currently planning a new internationalization process after 
consolidating Poland and the failed attempt to enter the Brazilian retail market. 
The purpose here is to analyze the Brazilian retail market, the one management 
believed Recall that 
Brazil was the market referred by Mr. Alexandre Soares dos Santos during a 
conference at Universidade Nova de Lisboa two months ago. 
Market Size and Growth 
Retail sales in Brazil haven been expanding at robust growth rates until 2009, 
when the financial crisis led to a significant decrease in the growth pace achieved 
before. The resilient domestic consumption sustained the retail market last year, 
with consumers benefiting from improved income levels, leading to an increase in 
the Modern Grocery Distribution sales of 5% YoY.  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E CAGR 
 400.723 449.388 489.802 504.830 631.257 12% 
Growth (%) n.a. 12% 9% 3% 25%  
 2.159 2.395 2.583 2.636 3.266 11% 
 71.312 79.241 85.920 89.960 110.576 12% 
Growth (%) n.a. 11% 8% 5% 23%  
 384 422 453 470 500 7% 
 
We expect the market to accelerate its growth from 2010 onwards, even achieving 
higher growth rates than the ones achieved before 2009. Our forecasts are based 
on: (i) the fact that food sales still account for 52% of the overall retail sales, well 
below the Western European standards we mentioned before, (ii) GDP Average 
Annual Growth rate of 4.4% until 2015, (iii) Population expected to increase from 
the 191 mn last year to approximately 200 mn in 2015, (iv) boom in credit 
availability and finally, (v) increasing consumer income levels.  Based on our 
econometric model, the Brazilian Modern Grocery Distribution should yield a 
CAGR of 15% in the next five years. 
We summarize our conclusions in the following table: 
 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E CAGR 
 631.257 757.684 874.111 993.538 1.112.965 1.243.392 15% 
Growth (%) 25% 20% 15% 14% 12% 12%  
 110.676 131.392 154.108 177.824 201.940 230.536 16% 
Growth (%) 23% 19% 17% 15% 14% 14%  
GDP Growth 5.5% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1%  
Population (k) 193.253 194.933 196.525 198.043 199.492 192.492 1% 
Inflation (%) 5.1% 4.6% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%  
 
Brazilian MGD market grew 
its sales at a CAGR of 11% 
 
We expect the market to 
grow its sales at a CAGR of 
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Exhibit 54 Brazilian M G D market B reakdown 
Source: T NS, Planet Retail and Nova E R Team Estimates 
Closed Market for now 
Even though we recognize the Brazilian MGD market a high growth potential, we 
believe it would be practically impossible for Jerónimo Martins to replicate 
. Despite the fact that the market remains quite fragmented, 
the market has three large players: Pão de Açucar, Carrefour and Wal-Mart41. 
We summarize the Market shares evolution of the first two retailers in the following 
table: 
) 2006 2007 2008 2009 CAGR 
MGD sales  71.312 79.241 85.920 89.960 8% 
Pão de Açúcar 5.085 5.600 6.781 8.432 18% 
Market Share 7.1% 7.1% 7.9% 9.4%  
Carrefour 3.839 5.608 7.255 8.309 29% 
Market Share 5.4% 7.1% 8.4% 9.2%  
 
Conclusion: Despite the fact the two market leaders control only 19% of the 
market, against the 38% we observe in Portugal, we recall that the Carrefour 
and Wal-Mart are international retailers with huge financial power when 
compared to Jerónimo Martins. Additionally, Pão de Açucar recently merged 
with another local retail giant, Casas Bahia
Bn. Therefore, we believe the Brazilian Market is closed for now and the 
company should focus its attention on other markets.  
  
                                                 
41 Unfortunately, Wal-Mart does not disclose its international sales, so we could not compute the Market Share  
 
We do not consider Brazil 
 
 
JERÓNIMO MARTINS, SGPS COMPANY REPORT 
 
EQUITY RESEARCH  07 JUNE 2010 
 
 
  PAGE 29/40 
 
 
 
Exhibit 55 Cumulative Returns since 
IPOs (%) 
Source: Bloomberg 
Exhibit 56   
Source: Nova E R Team Estimates 
Possible IPO for Biedronka?  
Jerónimo Martins excellent fundaments and strong balance sheet should allow it to 
pursue an aggressive acquisition, if really necessary, in order to continue its 
internationalization process. Recall that we have assumed the company to reduce 
e Debt to 
Equity ratio decreases from 112% in 2008 to a constant 60% in our valuation 
model. Therefore, we believe the company could easily increase its leverage 
without risking its strong balance sheet and liquidity position.  
Biedronka might help 
However, we highlight the fact the company could also proceed with an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) of its Polish business unit, raising the cash needed to finance 
a significant acquisition without significantly increasing its leverage. Additionally, 
the company could also distribute the capital raised through an extraordinary 
dividend, though we consider such scenario as highly unlikely to happen.  
As mentioned in the Peer Group Comparison, if we valued Biedronka through the 
Multiples we found for retailers focused on Emergent markets, our price target 
upside exists si
 
Therefore, we believe Jerónimo Martins could raise the capital needed to 
pursue a growth strategy (through acquisitions) by simply using an IPO for 
its Polish business unit. Thus, if we assume the company could raise capital by 
the Multiples found in the market, then Jerónimo Martins could in fact create value 
through this operation, assuming here that the true value of Biedronka lies in the 
applied in our sum-of-the-parts valuation. 
Regarding the percentage of Biedronka the company would put in the market we 
have computed a simple sensitivity analysis42. We summarize our conclusions in 
the following table: 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%43 
  8.19 8.27 8.34 8.41 8.49 
Implied Upside44 (%) 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 
 
Conclusion: we believe Jerónimo Martins would only use the IPO of 
Biedronka as a last resource option, in the case that a possible acquisition 
could endanger its Leverage and Liquidity position.  We also highlight the 
fact that previous IPOs of retailers in the Eastern Europe have been a 
success, which strengthens our analysis (see Exhibit 55).  
                                                 
42  Assuming no transaction costs involved, which we considered to be only residual in this  analysis 
43 In fact we have assumed 49.99%, implying that the company would want to lose control  
44 Assuming the price at 03/06/10 -   
The company could use 
 
 
JERÓNIMO MARTINS, SGPS COMPANY REPORT 
 
EQUITY RESEARCH  07 JUNE 2010 
 
 
  PAGE 30/40 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 57 
Exhibit 58 
 
Exhibit 59 
 
Appendix 
Rating Methodology 
Retailers exhibit different operational and financial dynamics due to the wide 
range of business models, segments and formats that exist in the global retail 
industry. The  are the same ones we have 
analyzed in Comparables, with the slightly difference that only part of them 
actually have an available public rating.  
1. Business and Cash Flow volatility 
1.1 Product Volatility 
The rationale behind this sub-factor is to analyze the fashion/product renewal 
risk, which is critical for retailers focused on non-food goods. Taking this into 
account we have attributed an Aa rating on this sub-factor since a large share of 
its revenues come from food related goods. 
1.2 Geographic Diversification 
Here, we focused our attention on the differences between countries since 
being present both in mature markets (low growth prospects) and certain 
emergent markets (high growth prospects). This sub-factor implies considerable 
geographic diversification for the higher sub-ratings and, in order to maintain 
some conservationism in our analysis, we have decided to attribute JMT a rating 
of A instead of Aa since its international exposure is currently limited to its Polish 
operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Seasonality of Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) 
Using the CFO of Jerónimo Martins we are able to capture not only the impact of 
rationale behind this sub-
with too much stock or, on the other hand, with a stock crisis that inhibits it to 
 
In order to satisfy this requirement we have computed the Cash Flow from 
Operations of the last two years regarding each single quarter, in order to 
measure the seasonality inherent to those cash flows. According to the following 
Despite the success of 
Biedronka the 
international expansion of 
JMT is still limited... 
Six key rating factors: 
 Business and CF 
volatility 
 Market positioning of 
the retailer 
 Execution ability 
 Real estate assets 
positioning 
 Financial Policies 
 Key indicator ratios 
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Exhibit 60 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 61 
 
Exhibit 62  Revenues vs Sales A rea 
Source: Company Data and Nova 
E R Team Estimates 
table, assuming once again a conservative analysis, JMT has an A rating in this 
sub-factor. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Market Positioning of the Retailer 
This rating factor considers the existing market position of a retailer as an 
the recent banking crisis.  
2.1 Scale (Revenues) 
This sub-
billion in the last year. Additionally, we expect the company to grow its sales from 
 billion in 2020, representing a CAGR of 7.5%, 
leading to a rating of Baa.  
2.2 Segmental Market Share and Competitive Position 
The objective here is to examine the market position of JMT within its segment 
(Food Retail) relatively to its main competitors, and also takes into account the 
competitiveness within the retail market. Furthermore, we have also examined 
here the concentration of players within their segment and the overall trend in 
market shares for the retailer, so that we can conclude if 
position is sustainable in the long run.  
According to our Market Environment analysis the company will remain the 
number one hard discounter in Poland, mostly due to its aggressive expansion 
plans and consequently scale, allowing it to maintain its unquestionable price 
grow at a CAGR 
of 10.4% in the next ten years. 
Regarding Portugal, the company will continue to be the largest retail group in 
what market share is concerned. Recall that the Retail Mainland operation is 
expected to grow its sales at a CAGR of 3.9%, versus the 10.4% of Biedronka.  
Concluding, and since the revenues are expected to growth above 10% only until 
2012, then gradually decreasing its pace until stabilize around 5% (see 
Financials  Revenues Growth), we attributed a rating of A in this sub-factor.  
 
 
 1Q08 2Q08 3Q08 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09 4Q09 
EBIT 56.0 69.6 91.7 85.6 60.9 72.5 115.7 106.9 
D&A 35.9 38.0 40.8 40.5 41.0 40.9 42.7 40.4 
Interest Expenses 24.8 19.3 17.6 23.5 17.5 17.6 18.1 17.2 
 33.4 38.4 65.5 49.9 26.0 32.1 36.2 41.6 
Income Taxes 8.2 10.4 19.3 8.2 7.3 12.4 18.7 17.3 
CFO 92.2 116.3 178.5 107.8 103.1 97.9 157.7 154.4 
% of Total 19% 24% 36% 22% 20% 19% 31% 30% 
The company exhibits a 
low level of seasonality 
regarding its Cash Flows 
from Operations... 
JMT is the #1 Polish retailer 
and the #2 in the 
Portuguese retail market.... 
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Exhibit 63 
   
2.3 Cost Efficiency and Profitability 
In this sub-factor we have used once again a quite straightforward method by 
measuring it through EBITDA Margins in comparison to the relevant competitors. 
Unfortunately, most of the retail companies do not disclose their EBITDA margins 
EBITDA 
margins since these are the best proxy we can get.  
Concluding, we decided to attribute a rating of A in this sub-factor. 
3. Execution Ability 
Even a retailer scoring the highest ratings in the previous sub-factors have to 
invest in developing and maintaining customer loyalty by ensuring that its 
logistics are efficient and correctly dimensioned in order to deliver the product to 
the consumer at the right place and time. The rationale behind such idea is that a 
retailer that is able to be both efficient and responsive to customer expectations 
will eventually benefit from higher revenue growth, allowing it to gain higher 
power over suppliers and then pass those benefits on to its customers, hence 
feeding a virtuous circle of growth and profitability 
3.1 Quality of Merchandise 
In assessing this sub-factor we have used the ability of JMT to produce like-for-
like (LFL) sales above relevant competitors45 both in Portugal and Poland. In this 
 
its attention only 
Markets. Therefore, we  retail operations in 
Portugal and Poland separately.  
 
 
                                                 
45 
operations in its key markets 
Sub-ratings Description 
Aaa Market Leader across multiple product lines and segments; static competitive environment; Concept is still growing and is 
demonstrably portable; Sales growth remains above 10% Unquestioned Price Leader 
Aa Market leader in its segment; highly stable competitive environment; concept may be maturing, but growth potential 
strategy Exhibits strong price 
leadership 
A Strong competitor, with market leader generally forced to react to and consider implications of strategy Stable competitive 
environment; still growing concept as it should have very limited geographic weakness Moderate price leadership 
Baa Solidly credible competitor that may need to rely on tactical promotions to maintain share in face of stronger players in core 
markets or segments; moderately changing competitive environment; concept generally mature and exhibit signs of 
competitive stagnation Little price leadership 
Ba Tactically competitive and generally price-promotional to maintain sales; moderately competitive in certain markets and 
product line niches; significantly changing competitive environment; concept mature and may be slightly eroding Price taking 
behavior evidenced 
B Minimal competitive presence; very significantly changing competitive environment; falling sales and no growth potential; 
long-term survival is questionable No pricing power except for very defensive promotions 
In this sub-factor we focused 
operations.... 
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Exhibit 64  Portugal L F L sales 
Source: Company Data 
Exhibit 65- Poland L F L sales 
Source: Company Data 
Exhibit 66 
 
Exhibit 67  Inventory Turnovers 
Source: Company Data 
Portugal 
The company has been able to overcome its competitors in the last three years 
by sustainably achieving a higher like-for-like performance. Considering Feira 
ations are 
undergoing through a major restructuring process involving a transfer of focus 
from non-food goods to a food related products, therefore less dependent on 
macroeconomic cycles.    
Poland 
are Tesco, Carrefour46, Metro and especially Lidl. Unfortunately, Lidl does not 
disclose any information regarding the like-for-like sales growth in its polish 
operations. However, recall that the German hard discounter is expanding at a 
much slower pace, accounting for only 365 stores in 2009 against the 1.466 of 
-
for-like sales growth also remained well below the one showed by Jerónimo 
 polish operations. 
annum above its main competitors, we have attributed the maximum rating in this 
sub-factor - Aaa. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Assessment of supply chain 
This sub-
robustness in terms of supply chain, analyzing its ability to get the right stock at 
time to deliver it to its customers. Due to our inability to accurately quantify such 
analysis we relied on the company own analysis when compared with some its 
peers. Additionally, we proceeded with an analysis focused on the inventory 
turnover 
us to attribute a rating for this qualitative sub-factor. Furthermore, we have only 
considered comparable companies with larger exposure to the emergent markets 
in order to provide a more accurate analysis. 
                                                 
46 Carrefour did not disclose its like-for-like sales growth for Portugal before 2009 
JMT had LFL sales growth 
consistently above its 
competitors both in Poland 
and Portugal.... 
similar to Tesco and well 
below its other peers.... 
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Exhibit 68  Revamping Capex and 
Depreciation 
Source: Nova E R Team Estimates 
Source: Company Data 
Exhibit 69  Capex by geography 
According to our analysis JMT has an Inventory Turnover (in days) similar to 
Tesco, and well below the other peers. Considering this, we have decided to 
apply a rating of Aa to Jerónimo Martins in this sub-factor. 
4. Real Estate Assets Positioning 
to the extent to which it can support or hinder future operational and financial 
performance, especially regarding the entry of new competitors.  
4.1 Quality of store base 
In this sub-factor we consider as a quantitative factor the Capital Expenditures 
budget tied to the relocation and refurbishment. The 3-year past average of 
Jerónimo Martins gross Capex (revamping) to Depreciation ratio yielded 92.7%, 
which would lead us to a rating of Ba.  
However, we also took into account our forecasts concerning the Capital 
Expenditures tied to revamping for the 10-year period, which yields an average 
ratio of 69.5%. Based on these calculations we have decided to attribute instead 
a rating of B for this sub-factor.  
4.2 Barriers to Entry 
In this sub-factor we took into account two different types if barriers to entry: 
Regulatory Barriers to Entry in Relevant Geographic Market and Cost of Real 
Estate Investments in the Relevant Geographic Market. 
In Portugal, the retail market is already a saturated one, with the regulator 
increasing its pressure to limit new openings and further concentration among the 
major players. Recall that the regulator imposed serious restrictions when Sonae 
 limiting new stores openings 
in certain areas, to the sale of some previous existent stores.  
In Poland the regulation is much more relaxed as regulatory requirements can be 
easily satisfied for most formats and operators. We recall that the company has 
increased its Polish sales area from 394.536m² in 2005 to 852.563m²  in 2009, 
representing a CAGR of 21.2%. 
he Southern Europe usually ranks Baa in 
these sub-factors, while the emergent markets rank Caa. Since JMT is much 
more dependent on the Polish retail market we decided to attribute an overall 
rating of B in this sub-factor.  
 
 
 
This sub-factor is based 
merely on qualitative 
assessments...  
The Polish retail market has 
low barriers to entry when 
compared to Portugal...  
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Exhibit 70 -  L iquidity Position 
Source: Company Data and Nova E R 
T eam Estimates 
Exhibit 71  
Source:  
Exhibit 72  
Source:  
5. Financial Policies 
This sub-
whether cash flows are returned to creditors or applied to enhance shareholder 
return.  
In terms of liquidity we have 
past 5 years and, despite the negative evolution of the Current ratio47, it remains 
strong with the Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) being equivalent to 60% of the 
 
Regarding shareholder returns we have used the most common ratio for such 
analysis, the Return on Equity, which climbed from 16.5% in 2005 to 18.8% in the 
last year. When compared with other retailers we expect JMT to outperform its 
peers in the following years (see Exhibit 70). 
Concluding, we have attributed an overall rating of Aa in this sub-factor due to 
the  
 
Sub-rating Description 
Aaa Very conservative; stable metrics, no "one-off" movements. Excellent Liquidity 
Aa Stable and Predictable returns to shareholders; Creditors share equally in cash flow growth and 
proceeds from any asset sales. Liquidity is strong 
A Predictable Share buybacks and acquisitions have minimal impact on metrics Possible event tied to 
acquisitions. Liquidity is strong 
Baa Financial Policies favor shareholder returns, possible track record of ratings migration following acquisitions. 
Liquidity is satisfactory 
Ba Clearly favorable to shareholders; Material debt-funded acquisitions and shareholders returns. Liquidity is 
satisfactory 
B Very focused on shareholders returns; Financial cushion may be paid out to shareholders ahead of business 
pressure. Liquidity is trained 
Caa Highly unfavorable to creditors: obligations close to default; Debt-restructuring likely .Liquidity virtually non-
existent 
  
6. Key Credit Metrics 
This sub-factor is quite straightforward as it based on simple quantitative 
assessments. We summarize the Key Credit Metrics in the following table: 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Debt/EBITDA <1.25x 1.25-2.25x 2.25-3x 3-4x 4-5x 5-65x >65x 
RCF/Net Debt >36% 30-36% 22-30% 14-22% 12-14% 8-12% <8% 
EBITDA/Interest >10x 7-10x 5-7x 25-5x 15-25x Jan 15, 2010 <1x per annum 
FCF/Net Debt >25% 18-25% 14-18% 12-14% 9-12% 0-9% Negative 
CFO/Debt >35% 25-35% 20-25% 13-20% 9-13% 6-9% <6% 
 
Capital Expenditures budget tied to expansion gradually decreases in the 
following years, leading to a deleveraging process. Considering not only our 
forecasts but also the past performance of Jerónimo Martins, and once again 
                                                 
47    =    /     
The company exhibited a 
strong financial position in 
the previous year...  
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Exhibit 73  
Source: Company Data and Nova E R T eam Estimates 
applying a very conservative analysis, we have achieved the following 
conclusions: 
 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E Sub-Rating 
Debt/EBITDA 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.1 Aa 
Retained CF/Net Debt 37% 31% 45% 61% 65% 57% Aa 
EBITDA/interest expenses 5.9 5.5 7.5 13.9 13.8 15.1 Aa 
FCF/Net Debt 93% 58% 32% 52% 38% 65% Aaa 
CFO/Debt 56% 49% 58% 92% 81% 91% Aaa 
 
    
.  
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Financial Ratios 
 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E  2020E 
Growth & Margins        
Revenues 6.1% 11.8% 10.7% 11.6% 9.1%  4.1% 
EBITDA 11.6% 13.2% 11.0% 12.6% 8.9%  25.6% 
EBITDA margin 7.2% 7.3% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4%  7.2% 
EBIT margin 4.9% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.1%  5.2% 
Net Profit 22.7% 27.7% 13.0% 12.3% 10.8%  4.2% 
        
Profitability        
Gross Margin 19.0% 19.7% 19.7% 19.7% 19.7%  19.7% 
Return on Capital 
Employed 
18.1% 20.4% 20.4% 21.4% 22.1%  20.6% 
Pre-tax RoIC 20.5% 21.7% 22.1% 24.1% 26.4%  37.1% 
RoIC 16.4% 17.2% 17.6% 19.1% 20.9%  29.3% 
RoE 18.8% 21.4% 21.6% 22.6% 23.3%  21.6% 
Return on Sales 4.9% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.1%  5.2% 
        
Liquidity        
Current Ratio 0.42 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.42  0.62 
Quick Ratio 0.24 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.25  0.46 
Working Capital (1.161) (1.297) (1.435) (1.602) (1.776)  (2.750) 
CFO/Debt 0.60 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.91  0.69 
        
Leverage        
Debt/Assets 23.0% 18.0% 18.2% 17.9% 17.8%  18.9% 
Debt Structure        
ST Debt/Debt 14.1% 12.0% 12.0% 12.0% 12.0%  12.0% 
LT Debt/Debt 85.9% 88.0% 88.0% 88.0% 88.0%  88.0% 
D/E 82.7% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0%  60.0% 
Net Debt/Equity 64.7% 56.7% 52.3% 45.4% 39.9%  33.4% 
Debt/EBITDA (x) 1.67 1.20 1.21 1.15 1.14  1.31 
Gearing (%) 64.7% 56.7% 52.8% 47.1% 39.6%  6.2% 
Coverage Ratio (x) 5.11 13.26 13.16 13.72 14.10  12.79 
        
Activity        
Fixed Assets Turnover 3.87 4.04 4.12 4.40 4.67  6.13 
Inventory Turnover (days) 20.60 20.00 20.00 20.00 19.50  18.0 
Receivables Turnover 
(days) 
9.52 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.50  8.00 
Payables Turnover (days) 101.5 102.0 102.0 102.0 102.0  104.0 
NWC (days) (58) (58) (58) (58) (59)  (62) 
CFO/Capex 3.89 1.43 1.33 1.74 2.01  2.45 
Capex/Depreciation 1.85 2.27 2.41 1.84 1.63  1.28 
Capex/Sales (%) 4.3% 5.3% 5.7% 4.4% 3.8%  2.7% 
        
Valuation        
P/E  19.95 17.65 15.71 14.18  9.29 
EV/Revenues  0.67 0.60 0.54 0.49  0.34 
EV/EBITDA  9.13 8.22 7.30 6.7  4.76 
EV/EBIT  13.47 12.10 10.82 9.80  6.55 
EV/Capital Employed  2.74 2.47 2.31 2.21  1.99 
P/B  4.27 3.81 3.55 3.38  3.03 
Dividend Yield (%)  50.0% 50.0% 70.0% 70.0%  70% 
FCF Yield (%)  5.0% 4.6% 8.5% 10.7%  15.9% 
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Financial  
Consolidated Balance 
Sheet 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E 
Tangible Assets 2.003 2.143 2.319 2.419 2.485 2.743 
Intangible Assets 835 940 1.062 1.167 1.263 1.950 
Other Non-Current Assets 214 220 235 263 318 895 
Total Non-Current Assets 3.052 3.303 3.616 3.849 4.066 5.588 
Inventories 334 360 398 444 473 640 
Trade Debtors, Accrued 
Income an Deferred Costs  
191 202 223 250 257 354 
Other Current Assets 24 42 46 51 56 81 
Cash & Cash Equivalents 223 72 128 217 347 1.400 
Total Current Assets 772 675 795 962 1.133 2.475 
Total Assets 3.824 3.978 4.412 4.812 5.198 8.063 
Share Capital 629 629 629 629 629 629 
Share Premium 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Others 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Retained Earnings 77 205 350 447 555 1.555 
Minority Interests 288 288 288 288 288 288 
 1.066 1.194 1.338 1.436 1.543 2.543 
Borrowings 756 630 707 758 815 1.343 
Other Non-Current Liabilities 166 166 166 166 166 166 
Total Non-Current 
Liabilities 
923 796 873 924 981 1.509 
Trade Creditors, Accrued 
Costs and Deferred income 
1.647 1.835 2.031 2.267 2.474 3.698 
Borrowings 124 86 96 103 111 183 
Other Current Liabilities 64 67 74 82 89 129 
Total Current Liabilities 1.836 1.988 2.201 2.452 2.674 4.011 
and Liabilities 
3.824 3.978 4.412 4.812 5.198 8.063 
Consolidated Income 
Statement 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E 
Sales 7.317 8.177 9.051 10.102 11.024 16.165 
EBITDA 528 598 663 747 814 1.168 
Depreciation (168) (193) (213) (243) (257) (335) 
EBIT 360 405 451 504 557 833 
Net Financial Expenses (70) (31) (34) (37) (39) (65) 
EBT 279 374 416 467 517 768 
Income Taxes (56) (77) (85) (98) (109) (161) 
Profit after Taxes 223 298 331 369 409 606 
Minority Interests (23) (42) (42) (44) (49) (57) 
Net profit 200 256 289 325 360 549 
Consolidated Cash Flow 
Statement 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2020E 
 
EBIT 360 405 451 504 557 833  
Depreciation (168) (193) (213) (243) (257) (335)  
Net Interest Expenses (70) (31) (34) (37) (39) (65)  
Income Taxes (56) (77) (85) (98) (109) (164)  
 NWC 136 136 139 167 173 107  
Cash Flow from Operations 527 626 682 779 840 1.049  
Net Capex (304) (437) (518) (466) (440) (532)  
Net Financial Investments 
and Others 
(16) (7) (8) (10) (33) (12)  
Minorities (23) (42) (42) (44) (49) (57)  
Cash Flow from Investment (332) (485) (568) (521) (522) (601)  
Dividends paid (66) (128) (145) (227) (252) (384)  
Increase / (decrease) in 
Loans 
(167) (165) 87 58 65 99  
Others 40 0 0 0 0 0  
Cash Flow from Financing (193) (293) (58) (169) (187) (285)  
Initial Net Debt 821 689 676 707 676 222  
 (131) (13) 31 (31) (65) (63)  
Net Debt 689 676 707 676 611 159  
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Disclosures and Disclaimer 
 
Research Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including dividends) of more than 15% over a 12-month 
period. 
Hold Expected total return (including dividends) between 0% and 15% over a 12-month 
period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including dividends) over a 12-month period. 
 
 
This report has been prepared by a Masters of Finance student following the Equity Research  Field Lab 
Work Project for exclusively academic purposes. Thus, the author is the sole responsible for the information 
and estimates contained herein and for the opinions expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own 
personal judgement. All opinions and estimates are subject to change without notice. NOVA or its faculty 
accepts no responsibility whatsoever for the content of this report nor for any consequences of its use.  
 
The information contained herein has been compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but NOVA or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete and accept no liability 
whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or its content. 
 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal opinion 
about the subject company and its securities. He/she has not received or been promised any direct or indirect 
compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report.  
 
The author of this report may have a position, or otherwise be interested, in transactions in securities which 
are directly or indirectly the subject of this report. 
 
NOVA may have received compensation from the subject company during the last 12 months related to its 
fund raising program. Nevertheless, no compensation eventually received by NOVA is in any way related to 
or dependent on the opinions expressed in this report. 
 
The School of Economics and Management at NOVA is a public university thus not dealing for, advising or 
otherwise offering any investment or intermediate services to market counterparties, private or intermediate 
customers.  
 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published without the explicit previous consent of its author, 
unless when used by NOVA for academic purposes only. At any time, NOVA may decide to suspend this 
report reproduction or distribution without further notice.  
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